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John Bates Clark and the 1914
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LUCA FIORITO
University of Palermo, Italy
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to analyze John Bates Clark’s influence in the
passing of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914. It is argued that
Clark was important to the passage of these acts in two ways. First, he exercised an
indirect influence by discussing in academic journals and books problems concerning
trusts, combinations, and the measures necessary to preserve the working of
competitive markets. At least as importantly, Clark took an active role in the reform
movement, both contributing to draft proposals for the amendment of existing antitrust
legislation and providing help and advice during the Congressional debates that led to
the passage of the FTC and Clayton Acts.
1. Introduction
Writing shortly after the passage of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
Clayton Acts in 1914, Allyn Young commented: ‘it is significant that in much
of the more serious discussion, both the analysis of the problem and the pro-
posals of the specific remedies involved the recognition of certain principles
that for some years had been very generally accepted among economists.’ In
the following passage, still in relation to the debates that paved the way to
the new antitrust package, Young insisted: ‘specific instances of the direct
influence of economic writing and teaching have not been lacking, and it is
fair to infer that through a process of gradual diffusion the indirect influence
has been considerable’ (Young, 1915, p. 204). Subsequent historians have in
general confirmed Young’s contention, maintaining that American economists
did influence the passage of the FTC and Clayton Acts in a way that cannot be
said of the Sherman Act (Klebaner, 1964; Mayhew, 1998). Economists influ-
enced the legislation indirectly by discussing problems concerning trusts and
combinations in academic journals and books, and by proposing policies
designed to preserve the working of competitive markets. Some economists
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played a direct role in the reform movement, providing expert testimony in the
Congressional debates and contributing to draft proposals for the amendment
of existing antitrust legislation.
The aim of this paper is to assess and document the role played by John Bates
Clark in these processes. When the groundwork for the 1914 antitrust legislation
was being laid down, Clark made a key contribution in many respects. His aca-
demic and popular writings on the so-called ‘trust problem’ significantly invigo-
rated the discussion of unfair competition that followed the 1911 dissolutions of
the Standard Oil and American Tobacco. Given his professional visibility,
Clark was increasingly sought out by official bodies for advice on the question
of trusts and large consolidations. In 1911 Clark was among the experts invited
to present their views on possible amendments to the Sherman Act before the
Senate Interstate Commerce Committee. He also served on a committee estab-
lished in 1911 by the National Civic Federation (NCF) to draft a revision of the
Sherman Act. The NCF draft largely reflected Clark’s views, and although the
NCF proposal was not the one eventually chosen, some of its key provisions
were incorporated into the 1914 antitrust legislation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents Clark’s view on
trusts prior to 1911. Section 3 discusses the impact of the 1911 courts decisions.
Section 4 analyses Clark’s post-1911 position on trusts as presented in his Senate
Committee testimony and in the second edition of The Control of Trusts (Clark &
Clark, 1912). Section 5 offers a digression on Clark, Wilson, and the 1912 elec-
toral campaign. Section 6 deals with Clark’s involvement in the NCF proposal
to amend the Sherman Act. Section 7 reconstructs the legislative history of the
1914 antirust package. Section 8 draws some conclusions.
2. Clark’s Early Views on Trusts
This paper is not the place for an exhaustive treatment of Clark’s discussion on
trusts prior to 1911. For the scope of this essay, a brief analysis of the views he
presented in the first edition of The Control of Trusts (Clark, 1901) will be
more than sufficient. We begin, however, with the closing passages of The Distri-
bution of Wealth (Clark, 1899), where Clark poses several rhetorical questions
pertinent to our topic:
To many persons any theory based on competition may seem to have somewhat of
the character of theoretical romance. Will not competition itself soon be a thing of
the past? There are forming on every side trusts and other consolidations of capital
that threaten to extinguish competition and to introduce a re´gime of monopoly
within much of the business field. Have we, then, completed the theory of com-
petitive distribution, only to find that the fact on which the whole of it is predicated
has ceased to be? If, when competition was at its best, theories of natural values,
natural wages and natural interest seemed to have a character of unreality, what is
to be said of them when competition appears to be a vanishing element?
To phrase it differently, how to reconcile the static idea of competition as permanent
condition with the factual evidence showing a continuous wave of mergers and
acquisitions such as that which was cresting exactly during those years?1
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According to Clark, it is the task of ‘economic dynamics’ to bridge the
widening gap between economics and the actual conditions of the economy—
and to show that competition is still an ‘inextinguishable force’ even in such
rapidly evolving environment. As he explained:
The consolidations of the present period change the mode of . . . action [of com-
petition], but they do not destroy it; and therefore they in no ways invalidate a
theory that assumes the existence of it . . .. Everywhere in life are there variations
from results that static theory alone calls for. Dynamic theory, if it were quite
complete, would give results from which, in actual life, there would be no vari-
ation; for it is a part of the function of this division of the science to account for
every element of friction, as well as for every change and movement that actual
life shows. (Clark, 1899, pp. 444–445)
Moving from these premises, The Control of Trusts can be seen both as an
exercise in economic dynamics and as an attempt to sketch an effective policy
agenda for the domestication of large economic conglomerates. In this connection,
it is worth pointing out that while Clark’s position on the nature of competition
underwent significant changes over the years, his general views on trusts, and oli-
gopolistic organizations in general, do not show any considerable discontinuity at
least after 1911 (Fiorito & Henry, 2007).
In The Control of Trusts Clark took the position that trusts, and combinations
of various kinds, were a ‘natural’ phenomenon and should be conceived as the
outcome of technological change coupled to increasing returns to scale that
could be captured by large industrial organizations. To put it bluntly, for Clark
the contest was not between big and small business but ‘honest’ (or ‘beneficial’)
and ‘dishonest’ (or ‘predatory’) capital. Honest capital secures gains through
advancing technology, thereby increasing productivity and reducing costs—a
benefit to consumers—while dishonest capital is garnered through speculation,
financial manipulation and assorted other nefarious activities. Proper policy,
then, aims to assure that the efficiency gains due to scale are preserved, while
pricing power based solely on size is reduced or eliminated (for all this and
what follows, see Henry, 1995, pp. 117–126; Morgan, 1993).
Clark generally saw government policy as largely ineffectual, mainly
because of bureaucratic problems, but also because it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for officials to discover the ‘correct’ competitive price that large
firms should charge. Moreover, if governments were to intervene in the pricing
decision, this would no doubt stifle technological change as it would interfere
with firms’ search for profit. His fundamental solution to the problem of monopoly
was ‘potential competition,’ a concept he had described some years earlier in an
essay on ‘The Limits of Competition’ (Clark, 1887), where he presented it as a
modification of a similar argument first enunciated in John Elliott Cairnes in
1From 1898 to 1902 at least 303 firms disappeared annually through mergers; 1208 disap-
peared in 1899 (Nelson, 1959, p. 37). According to Lamoreaux (1985, pp. 1–2), in those
same years at least 72 consolidations led to the formation of entities that controlled over
40% of an industry, and 42 to entities that controlled over 70%.
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1874. Essentially, potential competition is what would develop if monopolies
actually used their economic power to raise prices much above the competitive
level. Were this to happen, new competitors would appear to take advantage of
the higher profits associated with monopoly pricing and this would force price
down to the near-competitive level. In other words, if we do not observe entry
into a particular industrial field, existing large corporations are not unduly exercis-
ing pricing power. In Clark’s own words:
When prices are unduly high, owing to the grasping policy of some trusts, what
happens? New competition usually appears in the field. Capital is seeking
outlets, but it has become hard to find them. Readily, and sometimes almost
recklessly, does it build new mills and begins to compete with trusts, when
these consolidated companies do not know enough to proceed on a conservative
plan. Let any combination of producers raise the prices beyond a certain limit,
and it will encounter this difficulty. The new mills that will spring into existence
will break down prices; and the fear of these new mills, without their actual
coming, is often enough to keep prices from rising to an extortionate height.
The mill that has never been built is already a power in the market; for if it
surely will be built under certain conditions, the effect of this certainly is to
keep prices down. (Clark, 1901, p. 13)2
While Clark relied generally on competitive forces to keep monopoly power
in check, he was not a strict laissez-faire economist. As he put it: ‘What is needed
is a laissez faire policy in one sense of that term, but not in another sense. It
involves no dull letting alone of an evil tendency, but it does involve allowing a
natural development to go on unhindered’ (Clark, 1901, p. 84). Clark did see
limited scope for government intervention, in particular in those cases where mon-
opolies sold below cost to drive out a rival, where monopoly firms producing
various types and qualities of a good would charge a lower price for a particular
variety sold by the smaller firm, and where ‘factor agreements’, in which firms
forced merchants to refuse to purchase a rival’s product, were in effect.
The one area where Clark did call for fairly strenuous government regulation
was the railroad industry. As railroads serve all industries and no close substitutes
2Clark’s idea of potential competition, although profoundly influential among American
economists at the turn of the last century, was not immune from criticism. Arthur Cecil
Pigou, reviewing The Control of Trusts for the Economic Journal, objected that there
are no reasons for the monopolist to reduce prices in advance of entry. When a potential
competitor is deciding whether to enter, it will rationally look at the market conditions that
may prevail after entry as a consequence of the incumbent’s reaction, not at the price level
before entry. As Pigou (1902, p. 66) noted: ‘It is not enough for a potential rival to be able
to compete with the prices at which the trust at any time chooses to sell; he must be able to
meet those at which, by abandoning all “monopoly revenue” and contenting itself with
“normal profits” it could sell.’ Otherwise, Pigou continued, ‘even though all “illegitimate”
competition were made impossible, the risks before independent producers would still be
so great, that prices might be kept well above the point at which they could reap a profit,
without ever inducing them to come into the field. The latent power of the Trust to fix a
new price level, high enough to maintain itself, but low enough to ruin them, would
frighten them away.’
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for their services existed, government should exercise its regulatory hand in
administering prices, although in a rather interesting fashion. At that time, railroad
corporations were notorious in using their monopoly power to reward and punish
firms through a pricing policy that featured different prices to different firms for
carrying the same tonnage over the same distance. These prices were not public
knowledge but, rather, were arranged unilaterally and secretly. Firms doing
business with a particular railroad line were accorded favorable price treatment,
while those seeking alternative transport arrangements were punished. Through
varieties of price discrimination, companies attempted to increase market share
and profits. Clark argued that pools should be organized under government spon-
sorship in which the various companies would agree upon a single, common price,
divide markets among themselves, and eliminate competition. The cartelized price
would be higher than that of a competitive industry, to be sure, but it would be
public knowledge. Secret price agreements, the bane of consumers of railroad ser-
vices, would be eliminated and government would then have a much simpler job in
regulating that price to a closer approximation of the competitive standard.
3. The 1911 Court Decisions
Major concern over monopolies and trusts was one of the distinguishing marks of
the American Economic Association since its foundation and lasted well into the
early 1900s (Coats, 1960). The failed merger attempt of the Northern Securities
Company and the subsequent panic of 1902–1903, the 1907 financial crisis and
its aftermath, as well as the ostensibly illegal financial practices of many conglom-
erates, all contributed to keep the trust issue alive in academic circles. But it was
only after the 1911 courts decisions that the debate on the trust problem and on
how to amend the existing antitrust legislation acquired new vigor.
Up to 1911, the most important pre-1914 cases concerning the legality of
combinations brought about by either stock or asset acquisition involved the oil
and tobacco industries. The American Tobacco Company was primarily the
result of a series of asset acquisitions, although it also involved the acquisition
of competitors’ stock. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was primarily
a combination brought about as a holding company by the acquisition of stock.
The government won both cases, thus demonstrating that under the Sherman
Act a combination of manufacturing concerns could be dissolved, whether orga-
nized under the corporate form of a holding company or as a single corporation.
These high-profile decisions, which were issued by the Court on the same day,
introduced the so-called ‘rule of reason’ principle as a new benchmark for antitrust
action. This required a case-by-case approach where only combinations that
‘unduly restrained’ trade would be deemed in violation of the Sherman Act.
Any form of agreement for legitimate economic ends that only incidentally led
to a restraint of trade could be considered ‘reasonable’ and lawful. Both Standard
Oil and American Tobacco were found, under the ‘rule of reason,’ to have
engaged in anticompetitive practices involving discriminatory pricing and market-
ing practices (see Sklar, 1988, pp. 146–154).
In addition, the 1911 Supreme Court rulings against the American Tobacco
Company and the Standard Oil Company clarified state economic policy
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concerning actions of a holding company. Both trusts used the pyramided holding
company to control several subsidiary corporations and gain market control. As
noted by one interpreter (Prechel, 2000, p. 64), these decisions showed that ‘the
state was becoming more concerned about the use of the pyramided corporate
structure to gain market control than about market control per se. It was the
ability of corporations to control markets by controlling the assets of subsidiaries
they did not fully own that the state managers found problematic.’ As a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court rulings, the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
companies were dissolved.
The reactions to the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases by econom-
ists were immediate and widespread. In 1912, the Journal of Political Economy
devoted two full issues and much of a third to the trust problem. In the same
year, the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted their
Annals to the topic of ‘Industrial Competition and Combination.’ The following
year the AEA organized a round table discussion on ‘Recent Trust Decisions
and Business’, which appeared in the 1914 supplement of the American Economic
Review. Economists were, for the most part, critical of the court decisions.
According to Henry Seager (1911) from Columbia University—a colleague and
friend of Clark—the decisions had left uncertain the legal definition of when a
firm can be said to hold a dominant position in the market. In other words, the
‘rule of reason’ introduced a new unpredictability as to which business practices
were permissible and which not. In a similar vein, Jeremiah Jenks—perhaps the
most noted industrial organization economist of his day—criticized the ‘rule of
reason’ as a vague concept and lamented the neglect of economic considerations
by the courts in forging their decisions. In a 1912 paper published in the Journal of
Political Economy he pointed out that the Supreme Court ‘has failed to take suffi-
ciently into account the economic benefits that come from the saving of industrial
energy and the promotion of industrial efficiency by industrial combination’
(Jenks, 1912, p. 357). Jenks was also highly skeptical about the efficacy of the
remedies applied by the courts. In his opinion, the dissolution of the Standard
Oil trust and the creation of several quasi-independent refining companies, were
not just destructive of productive efficiency but also ineffective as an attempt to
restore competition: ‘it will be a failure if the separate parts divide territory or
make price agreements’ (Jenks, 1912, p. 354).
Clark did not publicly comment on the court decisions (aside from a passing
remark on the post-dissolution reorganization of the Standard Oil and American
Tobacco companies). But in The Control of Trusts (Clark, 1901, p. 52) he had
openly opposed dissolutions as ineffective. John Maurice Clark—John Bates’
son and coauthor of the then forthcoming second edition of The Control of
Trusts (1912)—did, however, actively participate to the debate. In John
Maurice Clark’s opinion, recent attempts ‘to break up the so-called trusts and
restore competition’ had accomplished ‘little more than to reveal obstacles . . .
that to many seem insuperable.’ ‘Our dissolutions,’ he continued, ‘dissolve
nothing: combinations are Protean, and we are baffled by shadowy communities
of interest which seem to have no body we can grasp’ (Clark, 1913, p. 114). In
his contribution to the AEA roundtable devoted to the Standard Oil and American
Tobacco decisions, Clark (1914, pp. 192) denied that market dominance made
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abuses inevitable and warned about the outcome of ‘active competition,’ which, in
his own words, ‘tends to bring prices down to a cutthroat level and so to end in
[collusive] agreements. . . .’ Ultimately, he argued, the ‘potential competition’
would function as a dependable safeguard. Beyond the prohibition of unfair prac-
tices, the younger Clark maintained that a crucial objective of any proposed
amendment to the existing antitrust legislation should be to halt problems in
their incipiency: ‘we need to be sure that unfair competition shall be attacked
as soon as it appears, not taken as evidence of illegal intent after it has done its
work. We need to save competitors alive, not try to revive them after they are
dead’ (Clark, 1914, p. 193). Like most of his colleagues, Clark called for more
precise standards than the rule of reason the Court pronounced in the Standard
Oil and American Tobacco cases.
Although too heterogeneous to define a definitive professional consensus, the
economists’ reactions to the 1911 Supreme Court decisions were nevertheless suf-
ficiently cohesive to delineate a prevalent uneasiness about the dissolution of large
conglomerates, and a general tolerance for some ‘reasonable’ degree of restraint of
trade subject to governmental regulation. Economists, by and large, recognized
that the new large-scale production organization of American capitalism required
a ‘trustified,’ or ‘administered,’ competitive market regime and a corresponding
adaptation of the law.
4. Clark’s Post-1911 Position on Trusts
4.1. The 1911 Senate Testimony3
Reactions to the 1911 Standard Oil and American Tobacco dissolutions were not
limited to academic circles. A growing apprehension had emerged in the political
arena as well, as many opinion leaders began to fear that the recent decisions
would increase the uncertainty concerning the legality of certain business prac-
tices designed to undercut the Sherman Act’s efficacy as a tool to eradicate mon-
opolies. These fears reached the steps of the United States Congress, and on
November 15, 1911, hearings began before the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce for the purpose of investigating ‘what changes are necessary or desir-
able in the laws of the United States relating to the creation or control of corpor-
ations engaged in interstate commerce’ (US Senate Report No. 1326, Sixty-third
Cong., 3d Sess., 1913). As we learn from William Letwin (1965, pp. 267–268),
lengthy testimony was taken from over 100 experts in the field, including
leading businessmen such as the steel tycoons Elbert H. Gary, Andrew Carnegie
and James A. Farrell; lawyers who had been serving as consultants in previous
antitrust cases such as Victor Morawets and Louis D. Brandeis; labor leaders
and public affair specialists such as Samuel Gompers and Lyman Abbott; and
eminent economists such as John Bates Clark and J. Laurence Laughlin.
In his Senate testimony, Clark first openly introduced the contention, which
he would develop in his subsequent writings, that in the current period the force of
3This section draws on Fiorito & Henry (2007).
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potential competition as a check to monopolistic power had lost much of its orig-
inal vigor because of the unfair advantages of the trusts. ‘Bullying’ tactics by
dominant conglomerates could prevent the emergence of new competitors and
therefore limit the check of potential competition on monopoly power. There is
a clear change in tone and emphasis from his earlier contributions on the
subject. In Clark’s own words:
During the more recent periods the public has had less confidence in the efficacy
of potential competition; and while I would not for a moment give the opinion of
other economists than myself, my judgment is that economists have somewhat
less confidence in it. What it . . . can do under existing conditions is less than it
was at an earlier time. The fact is that this potentiality of competitors was neu-
tralized by another potentiality, namely, the power of the great consolidation to
drive the competitor out of the field by unfair means whenever he actually made
his appearance. It was the swing of the club in the hands of the trust which ter-
rorized the competitor and prevented his actual appearance. It was bullying on
the threat of ‘slugging’ which means attacking the competitor unfairly, and
using weapons which the competitor does not possess. (Clark, 1911, p. 973)
What Clark now advocates is government promotion of ‘actual compe-
tition’—not just potential competition—largely through the banning of certain
unfair practices and, when necessary, through the dissolution of the ‘perilous’
trusts (distinguished from those labeled ‘harmless’). This conclusion was
founded on the assumption that only actual competition in a concentrated industry
will create new capacity, exert downward pressure on prices, and make collusion
more difficult by creating the conditions for an actual increase in the number of
competitors:
without a fair amount of actual competition merely potential competition is not
practically worth very much. There must be some actual competitors in the field.
When prices are high many a man would like to enter the field, if he could safely
do it. If then no one actually enters it, it is fair to infer that they are all under
terrorism. The presence of actual competition on that ground alone is quite
essential. But it is also essential that there should be some competition in
order to produce a direct effect on prices, and in this connection small local pro-
ducers perform a valuable function. (Clark, 1911, pp. 974–975)
In his testimony, Clark also repeatedly invoked what he termed ‘tolerant
competition,’ by which he meant a live-and-let-live form of competition where
big firms and small firms face the same pricing conditions and only efficiency
determines the profit outcome. While the honest trust may well win this contest,
such an outcome is not assured. Both large and small producers would face the
same external constraints and both (or either) would succeed based upon their
ability to advantage themselves through gains in efficiency.
Clark’s conception of tolerant competition was reflected in his policy propo-
sals. In his testimony he advanced four main points that would later be elaborated
and refined in the 1912 edition of the Control of Trusts: (1) the necessity of sup-
plementing the Sherman Act with more specific statutory prohibitions of certain
unfair practices such as predatory price discrimination and factor agreements;
(2) the need for a new regulatory commission to ‘rescue’ ‘actual competition’
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from the power of monopoly; (3) the regulation of holding companies; and (4) the
argument that the degree to which a firm is harmful is not its total capitalization,
but the ‘fraction of the entire capital of an industry’ which it holds. It is significant
that in his testimony, Clark placed a great deal of emphasis on this fourth point,
which is only briefly mentioned in the 1912 edition of the Control of Trusts.
Clark’s exchange with Senator Albert Cummins is particularly enlightening.
Cummins, a leading progressive Republican from Iowa, asked Clark whether, in
his opinion ‘a limitation, a fair and proper limitation, upon the amount of
capital which any one corporation can employ would not be a stop toward the pres-
ervation and maintenance’ of the ‘tolerant competition’ of which he had spoken in
his testimony. The subsequent exchange between Clark and Cummins is worth
quoting in its full length:
PROFESSOR CLARK. I may say, sir, that this is one of the cases in which I have
found myself demanding a thing on economic grounds and being opposed on
legal grounds. I think it is desirable to treat the capital of one company, as com-
pared with the total capital engaged in the industry, as an element in shaping a
policy in dealing with it. On economic grounds no fixed amount of capital would
apply to the wide range of different cases. Between a little yeast-cake monopoly
which once existed and the Steel Trust there is such an enormous range of differ-
ence that what would be an excessive capital in one case would not make an
impression at all on the necessary capital in the other case.
SENATOR CUMMINS. I do not mean a capital fixed by Congress, but a capital
limited by the act of some governmental board which would survey the field
and determine what amount of capital could be employed without unduly
restraining trade.
PROFESSOR CLARK. I am perfectly free to say that that is what I do believe in. I
should not appreciate the difficulty arising from the fact that the total capital in
an industry is a changeful amount. Of course it is. It does not change so rapidly
that, if a governmental bureau had a record of the real capital of each of the
various corporations of which it takes cognizance in a certain year, this might
not properly be made the basis of action for a short term of years following
that date. In my view, the amount of capital which one corporation can have
without danger to its rivals varies in different cases, but may always be
defined as the fraction of the entire capital of an industry which experience
shows that it may have without unduly restraining competition. It might be a
large part of the whole, but it would become too large a part whenever we
should discover that actual competitors were being unfairly crowded to the
wall, so that potential competition could not do what we expect of it. (Clark,
1911, p. 977)
After the Standard Oil and American Tobacco dissolutions, then, Clark came
to see sheer size as a competitive problem. Still acknowledging the efficiencies of
large-scale production, Clark now saw excessive concentration of capital in a
specific industry as a threat to both actual and potential competition. In his
view, the fixing of the proper limits of capital concentration according to each
industry’s characteristics should be among the tasks of a Federal Commission
with powers—as he stated in his testimony—similar to those of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (Clark, 1911, pp. 982–984).
When Economics Faces the Economy 147
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
uc
a F
ior
ito
] a
t 0
1:3
9 1
4 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
This was how Clark had presented his views in late 1911. More than a year
later, on February 26, 1913, the Senate Committee issued its final report which,
quite significantly, largely reflected Clark’s views. Accordingly, the Committee
declared that ‘the progress of the world depends in large measure upon that
fair, reasonable rivalry among men’ and announced ‘that the Sherman Act
should stand as the “fundamental law” on the issue of the nation’s competitive
landscape.’ At the same time it proposed, among other minor amendments, new
legislation that would ‘specifically prescribe certain conditions upon which
persons and corporations shall be permitted to engage in commerce.’ The Com-
mittee also called for the Creation of a new commission to (1) administer and
enforce the proposed laws; (2) serve as a reference for information about corpor-
ations’ management and practices; (3) handle issues that require ‘administrative
promptness . . . rather than judicial deliberation’; and (4) supervise dissolutions
ordered by the courts (US Senate Report No. 1326, Sixty-third Cong., 3d Sess.,
1913). As noted by one interpreter, the Committee’s final resolutions played a
decisive role in setting the stage for the newly elected President Woodrow
Wilson to urge the legislative package that evolved into the FTC and the
Clayton Act (Ward, 1986, p. 5).
4.2. Clark’s Post-1911 Academic Contributions
The second edition of The Control of Trusts appeared in early 1912 and was
written together by John Bates Clark and his son John Maurice. In the second
edition the emergence of great consolidations is still seen as the natural
outcome of the new technological conditions prevailing in industry, but with a
new—significant—change in emphasis. Trusts and combinations, it was argued,
offered a ‘way of deliverance’ from a competition that has become, or threatens
to become ‘ruinous’ or ‘cut-throat’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 3). The Clarks
referred to the presence of relatively high overhead costs and increasing returns
to scale as attributes leading to ruinous competition. In this case, when faced
with declining gross revenues, firms attempt to recover profits by cutting prices
and selling more at lower margins. While it would be rational for the industry
as a whole to reduce output in order to increase profit margins, each single firm
finds an incentive to displace its competitors by increasing production and
cutting the price. This, in turn, would trigger a reaction by competitors:
The other companies are in the same situation and have the same incentives,
while they are spurred to aggressive action by seeing their established market
taken from them by the belligerent tactics of their neighbor. So, first, there
comes retaliation and reprisal until a form of guerrilla warfare takes the place
of reasonable competition, and finally, the ruinously low prices spread over
the whole market and profits are turned into losses everywhere. (Clark &
Clark, 1912, p. 174)
The problem of ruinous competition was associated with high overhead costs
because in their presence prices can drop much further and still cover variable
costs. This in turn implies, in the words of Michael H. Best (1990, p. 50), that
‘companies can be hemorrhaging but still operating.’
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According to the Clarks (1912, pp. 3–4), ‘so long as mere pools or contracts
to control prices were depended on they were not as menacing as the later forms of
union became; and they did at least allay a warfare that involved much evil.’ It was
‘the appearance of consolidations that were firmer and more complete that caused
the menacing shadow of general monopoly to deepen.’ The whole situation was
made even more severe by the fact that the protection of potential competition
‘cannot be trusted as it could in earlier days’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 27)—an
argument anticipated by the elder Clark in his Senate testimony. This new focus
on ruinous competition, coupled with the growing skepticism towards the disci-
pline imposed by potential competition, was reflected in the increasing attention
devoted to the anticompetitive behavior of the trusts. It is true that John Bates
Clark had already condemned unfair practices in the first edition of The Control
of Trusts, but now the whole argument is further elaborated in a more emphatic
fashion. It was now pointed out, for instance, that the banning of price discrimi-
nation would place an important check on the process leading to ruinous compe-
tition. As the Clarks explained, ‘at the start [of an episode of ruinous competition]
the price-cutting covers only part of a firm’s consumers, and only when other pro-
ducers begin to retaliate does it spread to the whole. That is, it starts with discrimi-
nation. . . . If this were not possible, if any cut prices had to cover all customers or
none at all, would not a manager think twice before offering his whole output
below cost?’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 175).
The most important element of novelty, however, is to be found in the discus-
sion of the holding company as an unfair institutional arrangement—interestingly
enough, another aspect anticipated in Clark’s 1911 testimony and completely
absent from the first edition of The Control of Trusts. The holding company, it
was argued, allows corporations to control assets that significantly exceed their
capitalization through the creation of a series of intermediary companies within
a pyramided structure. The ‘unfairness’ of this legal arrangement lies in the possi-
bility of acquiring control of another firm at a reduced cost, i.e., without having to
bear the cost of acquiring full ownership. Further, the holding company permitted
firms to expand across state lines without having to pay ‘foreign’ corporation
taxes, i.e., the corporate taxes of states other than those of the initial state of incor-
poration. The Clarks placed their critique in harsh terms:
There is one institution, a bad product of recent development, for which no good
words should be said, and very few are said. It is the ‘holding company’ so
called, and is diabolically perfect as a means, first, of concentrating the
control of many corporations in a single one and, secondly, of concentrating
the control of that single company in a small minority of the real owners of
the capital and the business over which they have sway. It sometimes puts prop-
erty belonging to a vast number of owners at the disposal of a very insignificant
minority and because of its bad perfection in creating monopolies, which injure
consumers, and in building up little oligarchies within the monopolistic corpor-
ations, and so injuring honest capitalists, it finds few so mean as to do it with
reverence. (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 74)
The constitution of a holding company was also seen as the perfect complement
of some manipulative financial devices such as the inflated appraisal of the
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constituent companies’ properties leading to stock watering: ‘nothing is simpler
than this means of uniting rival corporations under one control and the excluding
the great body of owners from all power over them. First, inflate the capital of the
original and constituent companies until the common stock is mostly water; then
organize a new corporation to buy the majority of that water, and the thing is done’
(Clark & Clark, 1912, pp. 75–76).
As a remedy, the Clarks proposed the sterilization of the voting control held
by the holding company over its subsidiaries. To reach this end, they suggested, it
would be sufficient ‘if all the shares held by such a company were counted as a
single share for voting purposes.’ This should be coupled with specific prohibi-
tions concerning interlocking directorates: ‘If we impose upon stockholders’
voting power the limitation already suggested, we can hardly fail also to prohibit
the choosing of directors who have any considerable interest in other companies
from which their own is required by law to be completely separate in policy
and management’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 154). It is worth noting that it was
the ‘unfairness’ of the holding corporation as a device to acquire control at the
expenses of the majority of shareholders that had to be prohibited, not
the direct acquisition of a competitor’s assets per se. To leave no doubt on the
matter, the Clarks explicitly specified that their plan to sterilize the voting
power of holding corporations ‘would not of itself prevent combination by the
out-and-out method of buying out the property of rival plants or merging two cor-
porations in a single one; but it would prevent combination from taking that other
most subtle and pervasive form, in which those who have put in the majority of the
capital are completely shut out from control’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. 151).
The identification of specific types of prohibited conduct did not exhaust the
Clarks’ agenda. They understood that, while the enumeration of certain specific
offenses might provide a degree of added certainty in matters of antitrust
policy, such certainty could extend no further than the extent of the enumeration.
Left unaddressed was still the underlying issue involved in the 1911 court
decision—namely, how any statutory policy could reconcile the apparently irre-
concilable objectives of certainty on the one hand and flexibility on the other;
of identifying precise violations under existing laws and of preventing new
forms of potential violations in their incipiency. The solution was found in the
establishment of a federal administrative commission:
It is clear enough that in regulating trusts there are things to be done and needs to
be met that cannot be accurately foreseen and provided for by detailed and self-
acting statutes. Our methods must be so far as possible elastic, adaptable as to
ways and means though inflexible in underlying purposes; and yet these laws
must be applied definitely and forcibly. We cannot afford to have any large
section of the business world in doubt whether they have broken the laws or
not, and we cannot let the laws become a dead letter through vagueness. In
this view it is clear that an administrative commission can render invaluable
service. After commanding everything we can definitely command, and forbid-
ding everything we can definitely forbid, we may cover the rest of the field in
general terms and leave the commission to enforce them, as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission now enforces the general terms of the Interstate Commerce
Act. The need of such a body is probably the one thing on which the various
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plans now before the people are most generally agreed. (Clark & Clark, 1912,
pp. 59–60)
With this proposal, the Clarks joined a growing number of economists who
had expressed confidence in the ability of an administrative agency to deal with
antitrust problems (Fiorito, 2011). While the participants in the policy debate
were largely silent on the question of what procedural devices would be appropri-
ate to achieve the agency objectives, two distinct visions of such a commission did
emerge. While some economists saw the commission as having a purely investi-
gative role, with little or no enforcement authority over precisely defined viola-
tions of law, others, like the Clarks, advocated a more powerful commission
with stringent licensing powers and clear authority over unfair methods of compe-
tition. John Bates and John Maurice Clark envisioned a federal law under which
no corporation could engage in interstate commerce without obtaining a license
from the proposed administrative agency. Accordingly, the agency would have
the authority, subject to judicial review, to refuse or withdraw the license if the
corporation in question violated the terms of the license or other federal laws
(Clark & Clark, 1912, pp. 16, 15–16, 194–195). In addition, a corporation
would be required to publish properly audited balance sheets and income state-
ments. John Bates Clark was especially forceful in emphasizing the need for
public reporting. As he put it, the proposed federal agency would ‘impose on
every corporation a burden of proof; first, that it does not have the whole field;
secondly, that rivals maintain themselves by their own excellence and are not tol-
erated as a blind for the public; thirdly, that there are enough of them to affect the
standards of price in the whole industry; and fourthly, that the way is so open for
the entrance of more that prices cannot become extortionate’ (Clark, 1912a,
pp. 65–66).
5. Clark, Antitrust Policy and the 1912 Presidential Campaign
In the meantime, public concern about monopolies was influencing the 1912 pre-
sidential campaign.4 The Sherman Antitrust Act had become a crucial issue and
featured prominently in the platforms of the three major candidates: William
Howard Taft, the Republican incumbent; Theodore Roosevelt, the former Repub-
lican president now running as a Progressive; and Democrat Woodrow Wilson.
The Republican platform, after claiming credit for having ‘placed upon the
statute book . . . the antitrust act of 1890,’ proclaimed its support of ‘the enactment
of legislation supplementary to the existing antitrust act which will define as crim-
inal offenses those specific acts that uniformly mark attempts to restrain and to
monopolize trade. . .’ (Porter & Johnson, 1956, p. 178). While Taft was hesitant
to increase the certainty or severity of punishment under the law, he did wish to
widen its coverage. The Progressive Party favored ‘strengthening the Sherman
Act’ by prohibiting certain trade practices that were legal but unfair. Roosevelt
4On the role of the 1912 presidential campaign in the formation of antitrust policy in the
US, see Kovacic (1982) and Winerman (2003).
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specifically urged a commission with wide-ranging powers to regulate the issu-
ance of securities, compel publicity of corporate accounts, investigate suspicious
business behavior, and (in at least some cases) set maximum prices for goods pro-
duced by monopolies that had attained their position by superior efficiency. The
Democratic platform backed extension and vigorous enforcement of antitrust law:
We favor the declaration by law of the conditions upon which corporations shall
be permitted to engage in interstate trade, including, among others, the preven-
tion of holding companies, of interlocking directors, of stock watering, of dis-
crimination in price, and the control by any one corporation of so large a
proportion of any industry as to make it a menace to competitive conditions.
. . . We regret that the Sherman anti-trust law has received a judicial construction
depriving it of much of its efficiency and we favor the enactment of legislation
which will restore to the statute the strength of which it has been deprived by
such interpretation. (Porter & Johnson, 1956, p. 169)
Wilson was prepared to create some sort of trade commission, but he contem-
plated a far less powerful agency than did Roosevelt.
Clark decided to give his own intellectual contribution to the electoral cam-
paign in his dual role of academician and opinion maker. On September 20, 1912,
on the eve of the 1912 presidential elections, he wrote to his friend Woodrow
Wilson and sent him a copy of The Control of Trusts. In a crucial passage of
the letter, Clark reiterated his aversion to any policy contemplating price regu-
lation as a viable solution to the trust problem: ‘I am sending a little book on
Trusts. It shows . . . how grave is the error in the Van Hise-Roosevelt policy,
which relinquishes on slight proof, the hope of preserving competition in great
business, and accept with no appreciation of the most fatal objections to it, the
plan of regulating prices by a commission.’5
About two weeks later, Clark reviewed the presidential candidates’ official
agendas on trusts in an article for The Independent. Clark began by expressing
skepticism towards Taft’s defense of the executive’s ability to use existing legis-
lation aggressively to dissolve large conglomerates (as Taft himself had dome)
under a ‘rule of reason’ construction of the Sherman Act. For Clark, the
problem lies with the reorganization of the dissolved trusts. Both Standard Oil
and American Tobacco shareholders each had received shares in the firms’ succes-
sors; the shared ownership of the succeeding companies, Clark pointed out, had
the consequence of maintaining the community of interest and delaying the emer-
gence of effective competition: ‘if the units act in complete concert, if the prices of
their products do not fall and their monopoly is as strong as ever, a rule of reason
calls for some addition to the law’ (Clark, 1912b, p. 891; emphasis added).
5Clark is referring here to Charles Van Hise, who was president of the University of Wis-
consin and a close advisor to Theodore Roosevelt. In his influential Concentration and
Control, Van Hise (1912) argued strongly for a powerful administrative commission
with far-reaching authority to regulate prices. The quoted letter from Clark, dated Septem-
ber 20, 1912, is preserved in the John Bates Clark Papers, Rare Books and Manuscript
Library, Columbia University.
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Defending the status quo, as the Republicans were proposing, he declared, was no
longer sufficient.
Clark was more sympathetic to the Progressive platform. He agreed with
Roosevelt’s proposal for an administrative commission and applauded his com-
mitment to make certain unfair practices illegal. Nonetheless, he was critical of
the Progressive Party’s focus on price regulation, which he thought was both
wrongheaded and resolute: ‘Repressing predatory competition is thoroly [sic]
admirable, but doing that and nothing more may amount to a surrender to mon-
opoly. A proposal of price regulation implies some expectation of thus surrender-
ing’ (Clark, 1912b, pp. 893–894).
Finally, Clark turned to the Democratic platform. He began by expressing
approval of Wilson’s call for laws on price discrimination, holding companies
and interlocking directorates. Curiously, Clark did not comment on Wilson’s
views of the proposed federal commission. The distinguishing mark of Wilson’s
antitrust efforts, however, was his commitment to legislation aimed directly at
limiting corporate size—a provision that Clark himself had vigorously sustained
in his 1911 testimony:
This plan accords well with an intelligent policy in dealing with trusts, and the
actual policy of the party is intelligent. It proposes to exclude from interstate
trade companies having the clear characteristics of monopoly and recognizes
as one of these traits, ‘the control by any one corporation of so large a portion
of an industry as to make it a menace to competitive conditions.’ There are dif-
ficulties in the way of applying this test, but the worst that can be said about them
is that it will take wisdom and earnest effort to overcome them (Clark, 1911,
p. 894).
Further evidence of Clark’s support for Wilson is provided by a letter that
Benjamin M. Anderson Jr—then an instructor of economics at Columbia—
wrote to Wilson on behalf of Clark and himself. Anderson had been alarmed by
a report of Wilson’s views on trusts published in the New York Times on
October 12, 1912, which, as he put it in his letter to the future President,
‘quotes you as holding . . . that all that need be done in connection with the
problem of monopoly is to remove the special favors and unfair methods of com-
petition which have built up the trusts; and then “natural law” will take care of the
situation: that there is no danger in size as such: that, if they can be made to fight
fairly, you are willing for them to remain as big as they can’ (Anderson to Wilson,
October 15, 1912, in Link, 1966–94, pp. 420–421). Anderson explained that
Clark himself held a similar view in 1901, when the first edition of The Control
of Trusts was published, but that since then he had changed opinion. The salient
passages of Anderson’s letter to Wilson are reproduced below:
It is not enough, [Clark] now maintains, so to regulate competition that ‘poten-
tial competition’ may exist. There must be actual competition, on a considerable
scale, and in all important markets. And size, as such, is often a tremendous
factor in preventing this. . . . I may add that, while he waives the question of
details, he is disposed to believe that a Federal Commission, issuing licenses
to corporations doing interstate business, and having power to revoke them,
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will be an effective means of handling such parts of the problem as a call for
direct Federal action.
The evidence presented in this section indicates that Clark, despite his Republican
Party sympathies, endorsed the democratic candidate in the belief that Wilson
would pursue effective antitrust remedies. Wilson’s policy proposals appeared to
Clark as the only ones that could keep the trusts under governmental control while
preserving the working of ‘actual competition’ even in highly concentrated markets.6
6. The National Civic Federation Proposal
The second act of John Bates Clark’s direct participation to the antitrust move-
ment is tied to his involvement with the National Civic Federation. As a coalition
of progressive businessmen and conservative labor leaders, the NCF had been in
the forefront of progressive efforts to revise the antitrust laws since its establish-
ment in 1900 (Cyphers, 2002). In March 1908 a bill drafted by a committee of
NCF representatives in consultation with Roosevelt’s Commissioner of Corpor-
ations was introduced in the House by William P. Hepburn and in the Senate
by William Warner. The bill, known as the Hepburn bill, protected corporate
expansion under extensive federal regulation, restored the Sherman Act’s
common law interpretation to allow ‘reasonable’ restraints of trade, instituted a
federal registration of large corporations and unions, and expanded firms’ report-
ing requirements. The Hepburn Bill aroused fierce opposition and, in spite of Roo-
sevelt’s endorsement, was defeated in that session of Congress (on the Hepburn
Bill, see Sklar, 1988, pp. 203–285). In June 1911—on the heels of the Standard
Oil and American Tobacco decisions—the NCF set up a new committee on the
trust question that met for a year and which in turn appointed a drafting subcom-
mittee consisting of Seth Low, the president of the NCF; Talcott Williams, an
NCF leader and future director of Columbia University’s School of Journalism;
Jeremiah W. Jenks, the industrial organization specialist from Cornell; and
Clark. The result of the subcommittee’s efforts was a draft bill that obtained the
Federation’s approval and was finally printed in December, 1913.7 The bill was
then sent to Senator Francis G. Newlands, to Representative Henry D. Clayton,
to newly elected President Wilson’s commissioners of corporations, Joseph
E. Davies, and to the President himself (Weinstein, 1968, p. 88).
6In the closing passage of his Independent piece, Clark (1912b, p. 894) wrote: ‘The present
writer is a Republican, the descendant of Republicans, Whigs and Federalists. Tested by
general views of the Federal constitutions, he thinks both his hereditary party and the new
Progressive one have the advantage over their common rival. By the test of practical action
in the most vital issue of the day he concedes that the Democrats win.’
7The document, marked ‘Confidential’, was entitled ‘Proposal for a bill to create an Inter-
state Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, to provide for the registration and
license of persons, partnerships, corporations and joint-stock associations engaged in
intestate commerce, and for other purposes; Dec 16, 1913.’ A copy is preserved in the
Seth Low Papers (Box 105) at the Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia
University.
154 L. Fiorito
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
uc
a F
ior
ito
] a
t 0
1:3
9 1
4 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
The NCF bill proposed to separate the Bureau of Corporations from the
Department of Commerce and Labor and transform it into a seven-member inde-
pendent agency. Corporations with gross annual revenue in excess of $10 million
would be required to register with the commission and provide full information, as
the commission might prescribe. The commission would grant public access to the
information so obtained, as well as to other information collected in the course of
its investigations, and it would make annual reports to Congress. Registered cor-
porations would be required to obtain permission from the commission before
issuing new shares, including shares issued ‘for the purpose of acquiring
additional property.’ Any increase in shares made without the required consent
‘shall, in the discretion of the Commission, subject the corporation to a forfeiture
of license.’8 The commission would have the power, upon complaint or on its own
initiative, to refuse or revoke license for noncompliance with registration prescrip-
tions, and for violations of the Sherman Act. The bill also specified that the com-
mission might refuse or revoke license whenever it finds that in the conduct of its
business a corporation ‘makes or gives any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality in
any respect whatsoever; or subjects any particular person, company, firm, corpor-
ation, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever.’9 Upon revocation or cancellation of corporation’s regis-
tration, the commission could order the corporation to cease engaging in interstate
or foreign commerce. All decisions of the commission would be final, except that
a corporation might appeal in federal courts the commission’s order to cease trade.
Such suit in the District Court ‘shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits for
damages, except that on the trial thereof the findings and order of the Commission
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and that the complainant
shall not be liable for costs in the District court.’10
Clark, Jenks, Low and Williams set forth the principles underpinning their
proposal in a cover letter dated December 9, 1913, which accompanied the final
version of the bill.11 In its drafting of the bill, they stated, the committee had
acted under the assumption ‘that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of the United States, forbids restraints of trade, but not necess-
arily all restraints of competition. That is to say, the Sherman Anti-Trust Law is
specifically aimed at all restraint of competition which is brought about either
by monopolizing or by unfair practices; but the law does not assume that restraint
of competition and restraint of trade are synonymous terms.’ Accordingly, the
major aim of the NCF bill was to infuse into existing antitrust legislation a
higher degree of certainty by somewhat limiting the Court’s discretion in
judging whether certain acts, because of their illegal intent or effect, constitute
8Proposal for a bill to create an Interstate Trade Commission; Dec 16, 1913; Sec. 15.
9Proposal for a bill to create an Interstate Trade Commission, Dec 16, 1913; Sec. 12.
10Proposal for a bill to create an Interstate Trade Commission, Dec 16, 1913; Sec. 23.
11The letter is preserved in the Seth Low Papers (Box 105) in the Rare Books and Manu-
script Library, Columbia University. Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations which
follow in this section refer to this letter.
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an unreasonable restraint of trade. The proposed interstate commission—as the
committee’s members put it—‘so far from being an agency for the arbitrary
control of business, is to be an agency to help business men to determine
whether what they are doing, or proposing to do, is probably lawful or unlawful.’
The committee justified the placing of only those corporations with a gross annual
revenue of $10 million or more under the licensing authority of the commission on
mere organizational grounds: ‘if such administrative regulation of commercial
business is to be applied at the outset to all interstate business, . . . the mere
volume of such business will make it difficult, if not impossible, for such a Com-
mission to cope with the undertaking in any helpful way.’ Yet, in the following
passage it was added that ‘the principal evils of which the public are conscious
undoubtedly relate themselves to the largest corporations’—a remark that
evokes Clark’s emphasis on mere corporate size as a potential source of monopo-
listic power.
As to the federal licensing provision for the conduct of interstate business, the
authors of the NCF bill explained that under the current legislation any single state
of the nation ‘may create a corporation that does interstate business,’ and ‘the
State that creates the corporation is the only government in the world that can
regulate the corporation as such.’ On the other hand, the individual states have
no jurisdiction at all on the activities of the corporation. All this implies that
in the United States we have at present no government at all that regulates both
the agent and the interstate business that the agent does. This is a condition of
governmental feebleness, which has already resulted, and is likely to result
again unless it be changed, in a situation that is little short of governmental
chaos. It is certainly desirable, and in the opinion of many it is necessary that
the same government which controls the business that is done should control
the agent that does it, if interstate business in the United States is ever to be
freed from uncertainty and conducted under the protection of uniform law. It
is not often enough remembered that when the Federal Union was formed all
of the States had the common law, so that interstate business was then free
from conflicting legal requirements; but, with the development of statutory
legislation, the States have long since ceased to have a common law. So long
as the States were largely isolated, this was a matter of comparative unimpor-
tance; but now that the life of the people in all the States has been so far
unified that the interstate business of every State is probably largely in excess
of the intrastate business of that State, the subjecting of such business to the stat-
utory variations of forty-eight different commonwealths becomes a matter of
increasing embarrassment to the citizens not of one State here and there but
of every State wherever it may be.
The NCF committee had in fact considered the possibility of requiring all
large corporations engaged in interstate business to reorganize themselves
under a federal incorporation law. A federal law governing the financial and
managerial responsibilities of these corporations would have been significantly
more stringent than that of the individual states, which, it was noted, ‘have
competed with each other in the making of lax corporations laws.’ Its efficacy
notwithstanding, the committee discarded the measure because ‘the effort to
define the essential elements of a good corporation law is a matter itself so
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difficult, and as to which there may be so many differences of opinion, that it
has seemed best not to attempt to deal with that aspect of the subject in con-
nection with this bill.’
By the end of 1913, then, the NCF had formulated a bill which provided
for the federal registration of corporations, created an interstate trade commis-
sion, and introduced an elastic concept of unfairness borrowed verbatim from
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The NCF proposal was essentially Clar-
kian in its spirit. Clark’s view of a commission, as he had repeatedly affirmed in
his Senate testimony, was ‘somewhat on the lines of the Interstate Commerce
Commission,’ especially in connection with the latter’s power to prohibit or dis-
courage unfair competition (Clark, 1911). Similarly, the drafting committee
defined the NCF bill as an ‘effort to apply to general commercial business
the methods of regulation which have worked well as applied to the Interstate
commerce commission.’ Section 12 of the NCF bill, as its authors explained,
applied to ‘the business affected by the bill the precise language of the Interstate
commerce Law which has enabled the Interstate commerce commission to put
an end to rebating and every other unfair practice in railroading which has been
brought to its attention.’
It was the strict licensing and registration provision of the bill, however,
which revealed most clearly Clark’s decisive influence on the NFC proposal.
Clark in fact had openly contemplated a commission with broad licensing
authority both in his Senate testimony and his post 1911 contributions.
Writing on the need to restore actual competition, for instance, he had
affirmed that ‘If we refuse federal charters or licenses to corporations which
cannot show that active competition exists and that potential competition is
free and effective, we accomplish the purpose in view, and it is then less
important whether the field is in the possession of one colossal company
and many smaller ones, or in that of one company which is very large and
a number of others of moderate size’ (Clark, 1912a, p. 66). As noted by
Sklar (1988, p. 289), any predisposition in the direction of a strong pro-
license bill on the part of the other members of the subcommittee, especially
Jenks and Williams, ‘may have well been reinforced by Clark.’12
7. The Enactment of the 1914 Antitrust Legislation
The timing of the NCF proposal, and this might not have been a sheer coincidence,
corresponded almost exactly with actions of Newlands, Clayton, and the President
on legislation leading to the Federal Trade Commission Act (Weinstein, 1968,
p. 88). In January 20, 1914—roughly one month after the NCF had circulated
its draft bill—Wilson decided to lay out his own antitrust agenda in a landmark
12As to Jenks, the other economist in the NCF committee, I was unable to find any explicit
endorsement of a commission with licensing powers in his professional writings of the
time, and even his condemnation of unfair competition was cautiously phrased and
always conditional on circumstances (Fiorito, 2011).
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address to Congress.13 Wilson proposed, among other things: legislation to
provide ‘further and more explicit legislative definition of the policy and
meaning of existing antitrust law,’ and the creation of an ‘intestate trade commis-
sion’ which would provide guidance on the formulation and interpretation of anti-
trust laws and help courts frame effective relief in cases involving antitrust
violations (Winerman, 2003, pp. 51–92).
It was against this background that the bills which eventually became the
FTC and Clayton Acts were introduced in Congress. The legislative path of the
1914 antitrust legislation was a particularly tortuous one and needs only to be reca-
pitulated here in its essential steps; our historical reconstruction draws heavily on
Winerman (2003). The House took up antitrust legislation first. Representative
Henry Clayton prepared five tentative bills (the so-called five brothers). When
the bills were introduced into the House, the provisions that would in the end
develop into the Clayton Act were incorporated into a single bill that was referred
to Clayton’s judiciary committee, while the Commission bill was referred to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.14 In the Senate, Newlands
had introduced a commission bill identical to Clayton’s. The Clayton and New-
lands bills contained no reference to unfair practices. The new agency would
receive annual reports from large corporations; would investigate Sherman Act
cases on behalf of the Justice Department; and would report to the President
and Congress on the need for additional antitrust legislation. Thus, the new
agency would have few substantive powers beyond advisement and providing
information to the public. On June 5, 1914, the House passed its Commission bill.
However, the core of Wilson’s original program was the Clayton bill, which
was facing political resistance in the House. As documented by Winerman (2003,
pp. 37–38), even before the House passed its versions of antitrust bills, Louis
Brandeis and George Rublee—two influential advisers to Wilson, both of whom
were associated with the NCF—persuaded the President to support a stronger
Commission bill in an effort to salvage an effective antitrust package. The pro-
posed commission was still weaker than the one envisioned by Clark and the
NCF drafting committee, but the Senate did grant the commission enforcement
power by adding a provision (in Section 5) that gave it authority to prohibit
unfair methods of competition. Dissenters raised their voices. Some opponents
argued that this made the commission, which was also authorized to enforce the
Clayton Act, too strong. Others objected that the proposed commission would
be too weak because it would have no licensing power and no authority in the
area of investment strategy. Despite these objections, the FTC Act was passed
by Congress and signed into law by President Wilson in September 1914. The
13Wilson’s speech on antitrust legislation was delivered to a joint session of Congress on
January 20, 1914; the text of the speech can be found in Link (1966–94, Vol. 29, pp. 153–
158).
14In testimony given before the Judiciary Committee in February 1914, Clark (1914,
p. 328) affirmed that the measures proposed by Clayton were ‘in absolute harmony with
the requirements of economics, with present conditions and economic tendencies . . ..’
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Clayton antitrust bill, now reduced in significance because of Wilson’s acceptance
of a regulatory commission strategy, became law on October 15, 1914.
The FTC Act provided for a board of five members, no more than three of whom
could come from the same political party. The core of the FTC’s authority rested in
three fundamental provisions contained in Section 5, namely that ‘unfair methods of
competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful;’ that the commission has the
effective power to determine which methods are unfair; and that it can order offenders
to ‘cease and desist’ from using such unfair methods.15 In addition, the agency could
require annual and special reporting by corporations engaged in interstate commerce,
while providing the public with information the agency gathered in order to promote
fair trade practices. The new agency could also assist the judiciary in formulating
remedial orders to deter future antitrust violations.
The Clayton Act represented a different approach from the FTC Act. In
framing Section 5 of the FTC Act, in fact, legislators recognized the difficulty
of specifying all the anti-competitive practices that then existed and, accordingly,
granted the new commission generous discretion to define and limit attacking such
practices. The Clayton Act, instead, was intended to supplement the Sherman Act
by addressing additional specified practices that might pass through perceived
loopholes in the earlier statute.16 It had four principal provisions.
. Price discrimination in connection with interstate commerce was declared to be
unlawful ‘where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.’ The Act allowed differences based
on grade, quality, on the quantity sold, on the cost of selling and transportation,
or when ‘made in good faith to meet competition’ (Section 2).
. Exclusive selling or leasing contracts, whether of patented or unpatented
articles, whose effect may be to ‘substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly’ were also declared unlawful (Section 3).
. The acquisition of stock in one corporation by another, or the combination of
two or more corporations through stock ownership, where the effect ‘may be
substantially to lessen competition, . . . to restrain commerce . . ., or tend to
create a monopoly,’ is prohibited. The Act excluded existing corporate relations
and made exemptions in the case of common carriers developing branch lines,
and of subsidiaries companies (Section 7).
. Complicated limitations were imposed upon interlocking directorates. The pro-
vision relating to industrial combinations prohibited any person, after two years
from the approval of the act, from being a director in two or more corporations,
any one of which has a capital of a million dollars or more, provided that the
business carried on by such corporations be of such a nature ‘that the elimin-
15These ‘cease and desist’ orders could be issued only after hearings, could be enforced
only through decrees of circuit courts of appeal, and were subject to appeal.
16The text of the Clayton Act can be found online at: http://www.justice.gov/ atr/public/
divisionmanual/chapter2.pdf. The passages quoted below are cited by the relevant section
number of the Act.
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ation of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation’
of the antitrust laws (Section 8).
In addition to these prohibitions of monopolistic practices, Section 6 of the
Clayton Act partially exempted labor unions and farm cooperatives from the
domain of antitrust legislation because of their non-profit status and their
purpose of mutual benefit.
Made up as it is of material drawn from the four original Clayton bills that
were at one time under consideration in different committees of Congress, the
Clayton Act lacked the simplicity and unity of the FTC Act. Moreover, the speci-
ficity of its prohibitions was blurred by the necessity of showing that the prohibited
behavior will probably ‘substantially lessen competition.’ Apart a few notable
exceptions, such as Allyn Young, American economists viewed the 1914 antitrust
package favorably. Sympathetic assessments came from very different directions.
Edward Dana Durand (1914, p. 73), an ardent advocate of the dissolution of trusts,
observed that ‘if the destruction of trusts and the maintenance of competition be
accepted as a proper policy, these acts must be approved for the most part as valu-
able aid in carrying out that policy.’ Henry Seager (1915, p. 448), whose views
were similar to those of John Bates Clark, hailed the new acts as ‘as a legislative
endorsement of the position already taken by the courts substituting the policy of
“regulated competition” for the policy of “enforced competition”’; while William
S. Stevens (1914, p. 854), who had focused on unfair competitive conduct,
affirmed that ‘the power over unfair methods of competition which has been
given to the Trade commission is an important step in the direction of eliminating
those practices and therefore toward the ultimate solution of the trust problem.’
Curiously enough, neither John Bates Clark, nor his son John Maurice commented
on the passing of the 1914 antitrust legislation—and this in spite of the key role
they played in the debates and reform movements that paved its way.
8. Conclusions
John Bates Clark was the most influential economist to support and promote the 1914
Clayton and FTC Acts. When the 1911 dissolutions turned public sentiment and pol-
itical agendas in favor of such a legislatives measure, his work presented a coherent
idea of what kind of unfair activities had to be banned, what the proposed federal com-
mission should do, and how it should be empowered to achieve those ends. In 1912,
together with his son, he published the second edition of his seminal The Control of
Trusts, where, among other things, they advocated expanding the scope of the
Sherman Act so as to prohibit precisely those activities and institutional conditions
that would eventually be prohibited by the final version of the Clayton Act.
Clark’s involvement with the NCF was equally important, albeit less successful.
Clark was among the coauthors of a NCF-sponsored draft bill that contemplated a
federal commission with strict and pervasive licensing and enforcement powers
over anticompetitive practices similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Although the final version of the FTC Act envisioned a far more active and
powerful agency than anything Wilson had advanced during his campaign, it
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lacked the three key measures that represented the core of the Clark-NCF proposal,
namely (1) registration of all large corporations with the commission; (2) commission
control over capitalization and stock issue; and (3) federal licensing by the commis-
sion as a necessary condition for corporations to engage in interstate commerce.
All this leads to our final point, i.e. Clark’s conception of competition. Our
reconstruction has shown that in his discussion of the trust problem, Clark—a pio-
neering neoclassical theorist—avoided formalism and did not attempt to define
competition according to a set of fixed abstracts standards. In an ever-changing
environment, Clark perceived increasing size and market power as an essential
part of a new form of competition that had supplanted the old-style struggle
among small non-integrated firms. Yet, he understood that even under these
new economic conditions competition could still promote social justice and the
efficient apportionment of capital and labor between different activities. Here
Clark introduces an ethical element into his argument: ‘The line across which,
in the field of economics, a great moral battle is now waging is the one which sep-
arates the powers which make for the welfare of society from those which prey
upon it’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, p. ix). The new policy challenge was to distinguish
between the predatory elements in the economy from the monopolistic tendencies
that were intrinsic to the new competitive order of large-scale production. This is
why Clark’s analysis did not focus exclusively on the competitive structure of the
market as defined by the mere size of the competitors and their actual or potential
market power, but also—and in some case predominantly—on the actual behavior
of large firms and its anticompetitive consequences. Were it not disrupted by
unfair practices such as those that had led to the dissolution of the Standard Oil
and American Tobacco Companies, the new competitive order would exhibit
superior efficiency and would, at the same time, reduce social conflict in the
market arena. In a nutshell, the frictions introduced by the unavoidable monopo-
listic elements of modern competitive enterprise, if properly controlled, would be
more than offset by the elimination of the waste of the old-style competition. As he
and John Maurice Clark state in a crucial passage of the 1912 edition of the
Control of Trusts, ‘we do not want competition to be as fierce as it has been in
the past, for that kind never lasts long, and while it lasts it does more harm than
good. The more moderate rivalry that would be set up in the way [we have] pro-
posed offers at least some probability of permanence, so that we should be likely
to have more competition left after twenty years than after twenty years of the
present attempts to preserve “free” warfare’ (Clark & Clark, 1912, pp. 114–115).
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